Iran's Reformists and the 2024 UN General Assembly

The 2024 UN General Assembly session coincided with major developments in Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas, raising questions about Iran's internal political dynamics and the influence of reformist elements. The USA is using update intel briefs Two years ago, the UN General Assembly session in 2024 was around the time the Iranian created resistance was dismantled from within, courtesy the reformist return to the seat of power in Tehran. With a supreme leader much less intrusive than the previous ons, the reformists had the free ride to say what they liked at the UN session, as well as meet people and above all send signals which did not match with the core principles of the republic. As was expected, the month of September started with the pagers episode and ended with the killing of the top leadership of Hezbollah; notable amongst them Syed Hasan Nasrullah. That massacre was soon followed by similar operations against Hamas in Gaza and other territories. The near ineffectiveness of the Iranian deep state and the complete reign of the elements opposed to the Nezam could be gauged from the fact that the Hamas supremo Ismail Hania was brutally killed the very next day the reformist president took the oath. What happened next in terms of the so-called restart of the JCPOA in June 2025 and again in February 2026 is history; rather the time when events happened then; continue to influence the trajectory of developments now; like, continued US oscillation between restarting hostilities, crippling sanctions or making a deal with Iran. The February 28 strike was intended to redo in a more brutal manner what the USA and then UK did with Mossadeq on 19 August 1953. At that time a rented crowd was expected to do the needful. However, on February 28, it was expected that with the Islamic republic decapitated it would be an easy ride to dismantle the system. The disgruntled crowd did not turn up to take control of the street; instead the pro-Nezam crowd took control of the street, the Iranian retaliatory strikes started and the rest has been reported extensively. The regime change forces tried hard to still target people close to the Nezam, however, it was too late for them; the regime change crowd, to make any lasting impact on the turn of events. It is important for the stakeholders in the peace in the Middle East; and in the MoU midwifed by the Pakistani military establishment to update their perceptions of what is transpiring in Iran. The new leadership, cryptically coming out of the closet to manage things, might not be as diplomatic within and without. The approach might well be more direct than it was a year ago. If the current situation in the Middle East is like a raging war scene, who the supreme commander of the forces across the Hormuz is as important for the peace stakeholders to understand then being merely postmen for a distant waning power. It seems the theocratic republic is here to stay, whether the White House likes it or not The reformists, under pressure from the street and the majority of the nationalist Iranian sentiment, prefer to take the back seat; not until the pro-US regional stakeholders tried on behalf of the USA to create grounds for what the Iranian radicals' term as 'restarting the negotiations which go nowhere'. The obnoxious signaling by US President Donald Trump that there are Iranians ready to talk to him, practically torpedoed the reformists' efforts, if any, to make a new beginning with the USA. The negotiations were held for complete two months and there were indications that the reformists had converted people to their cause, with the speaker of the parliament refusing to open the House, which could have potentially enabled questions on the 'fragile' MOU under the Iranian constitution, clauses 75-77. However, as things stand the whole exercise proved futile. New supreme leader Mujtaba Khamenei, who was elected by the leadership council nine days after the assassination of Syed Ali Khamenei, whose approval for the MoU was critical from the standpoint of the Iranian system, accepted the reformist initiative; but with the pinch of salt; adding in his approval text that he was okay with the reformist administration efforts only on the 'personal guarantee of the President'. That conditional approval, gav,e the playing field to the political forces opposed to a Camp David-style arrangement with the USA, and also left the reformists with much lesser influence to steer the decisions. Towards that end, the holding of a weeklong funeral for the slain supreme leader further radicalized the street and consequently the public opinion, towards not giving in to the US pressure as the speaker of the parliament and the president wanted. The reformists even made the grandson of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. generally regarded as close to the reform camp, to issue a statement likening the talks (even on unequal footing) with those of Hudabiya. However, the initiative was lost. The negotiations were not completely called off, but were rationalized in a way to make them a more painstaking affair than the simple walkover wished by former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and others. The key appointments during the last few months in fact showed that Mujtaba was not a ghost figure, but a wounded combatant who still mattered behind the scenes. The appointment of old IRGC hand Mohsen Rezai as Secretary of the National Security Council greatly radicalized the situation to the disadvantage of the Zarif camp. In a way, the supreme leader, first assassinated and then forced to remain in hiding, came gradually to call the shots. Two years forward from 2024, the reform camp is there to represent the republic in the world forum, yet the world knows fully well who is calling the shots in Tehran. Despite the fact that the pro-diplomacy group is not stopped from pursuing its goals, these goals are defined within the parameters as set by Mujtaba. Despite the fact that the reformists still want a 60-day ceasefire, they are being restrained from Tehran that time to decide for the USA is only 96 hours. As a matter of fact, the regime change in Iran; what was intended turned out to be a different ball game. Compared to his father; whose legitimacy as supreme leader was held in doubt from day one; which forced the slain leader to be accommodative to somewhat rude political trends; a fact proven by the track record of his 37 years of supreme leadership that not a single non-compliant president was subject to any impeachment exercise. As regards the JCPOA, the slain leader gave a free hand in finalizing the 2015 JCPOA and allowed complete freedom during the June 2025 and February 2026 period, the later date culminated in his coordinates being exposed by the insider double agents and his eventual elimination in a hail of Tomahawks. In contrast, the current supreme leader has donned the cap of leadership, which has been already painted red by the blood spilled by his father and his comrades the IRGC. Such a legacy reminiscent of the 7th century tragedy of Karbala, draws not only sympathy, but a call for revenge, not just killing the other, but resisting being influenced and compromised by the same forces. The new leadership, in a way, defines a new Iran. An Iran where the police are now not bothered by what women might wear; but an Iran, which is fiercely nationalist in radical Shia clothing; ready to take on the whole world. An Iran which might need the added attention of the international stakeholders to understand and consequently redefine their way of approaching the Iranian theocratic state. An understanding, rather a lack of understanding on part of the Trump Administration which remains a wanting factor nevertheless. Just like an obsolete intelligence dossier supplied to an unsuspecting combat pilot for striking the target and the aftermath turns out to be a 'collateral damage exercise'. The Trump Administration regretfully; is religiously following decades-old 'intelligence briefs' which depict an Iran which is different from the one which is actually on the ground. It is important for the stakeholders in the peace in the Middle East; and in the MoU midwifed by the Pakistani military establishment to update their perceptions of what is transpiring in Iran. The new leadership, cryptically coming out of the closet to manage things, might not be as diplomatic within and without. The approach might well be more direct than it was a year ago. If the current situation in the Middle East is like a raging war scene, who the supreme commander of the forces across the Hormuz is as important for the peace stakeholders to understand then being merely postmen for a distant waning power. It seems the theocratic republic is here to stay, whether the White House likes it or not.