Iran-US War: Why Renewed Conflict Remains Uncertain

Despite frequent warnings of renewed conflict between Iran and the United States, signs of behind-the-scenes communication suggest that a major escalation remains unlikely unless diplomatic channels fail, public pressure intensifies, and negotiations lose their effectiveness. Zarif scores more points than Pahlavi scion No day or a week passes in the major headlines, the X or any other media outlet that the war between Iran and the USA is about to resume in one way or another. Yet what is being observed is that there is an unwritten understanding or a truce; an unspoken intimacy of sorts between the prime stakeholders; the USA as well as the people who actually matter in the corridors of power in Tehran; that the resumption of war at the previous levels is unlikely to escalate. If it will escalate, it will happen when the avenues for that communication are exhausted, the street pressure is unmanageable and thirdly, the communication has lost its utility. Two weeks ago, in these very columns, it was discussed that the regime change operation in Iran could not apparently get it was supposed to do, the rapid collapse of the Theocratic government and the replacement of the so called 'rogue' infrastructure by the 'compliant' infrastructure, that is the reformists, in the position of power and influence. That could not happen as it could have ended the war in two or three weeks, depending upon how much time the invading military took in eliminating the regime figures. The other way round, it can again be a quick escalation aimed at this time a complete regime changes with devastating repercussions for the Iranians. Given the fact that the number of stakeholders on the US side have increased on the back of regional developments; the pressure on Iran to make a deal like Camp David is as much as going for a decisive push precipitating a stalemate which is negotiated by Rezai; not Araghchi It is on record that while the administration figures were largely spared the direct strikes and the president and the foreign minister of the reformist administration have to invent narratives that they 'barely escaped unhurt' on so and so day. Likewise, the IRGC key commanders as well as Ali Larijani were practically hounded and killed; which meant that the ground intel on these figures was provided by the individuals who would have wished for the change of the regime. There are similar accounts of Mujtaba Khamenei being hounded from one hospital to another through relentless air strikes; and the attack on members of the Experts Council or the 'Leadership Council'. However, the results could not be achieved as expected. The column of that very page concluded that what the world bought in the end was a stalemate, stagflation and no end to the crisis. But the effort was still not without dividends for the regime change proponents. The intended end result for the complete project was the restoration of the previous monarchy, the Pahlavi dynasty; whose worldview fitted in well with what Washington and Tel Aviv think about Tehran. That did not happen, but what did happen, expressed in no uncertain terms by the US President, was the power gained by the reformists in the day-to-day management of Iran in the post-Khamenei period. In the early days of war with the street in complete support for the slain leader, there was no point or logic for the reformists to say anything which could make them suspect in the eyes of a large cross section of the public. The initiatives apparently taken independently by the Pakistani leadership, but actually orchestrated from Washington to the Presidency in Tehran, broke the stalemate for the reform camp. The president and the foreign minister, the front men for the Zarif administration, were able to create a weak support for the talks with the USA in a bid to do the following; in their own agenda, normalization of relations with the USA, for the USA a foothold in Iran; with regime decapitation already done by the CENTCOM and IDF in the form of targeting the leader and the IRGC; the available administration willing rather desperate to talk with the USA in whatever way they can. As things stand, the possibility of war is weak on the count, despite the 'radical tones' of the few reformist office holders; the deliberate 'positive signalling for normalization with the USA and possibly Israel' is being done by the main reform leadership. A scroll through the wall of X/Twitter will reveal there have been intentional leaks of the conversations by the former FM and current force behind the reform camp in which scathing remarks were made against the political line taken by the late supreme leader. The video claimed that the diplomatic setup in Iran was nothing but what Zarif argued was the 'extension of the Quds Force'. Similarly, the former president of Iran Khatami has argued without mincing words that 'Iran has no right whatsoever to interfere with the affairs of the Palestinians. These statements, as the radicals predictably argue, are music to the ears of the key policymakers in Washington as well as Tel Aviv. Similarly, despite the red flag on negotiations argued by the new leader Mujtaba Khamenei and authenticated by the IRGC and the select elements in the corridors of power, who still subscribe to the worldview of the slain leader specially the secretary of the Iranian National Security Council Mohsen Rezai; the reformists are still trying hard to sell their point of view to the Iranian public opinion. In a very recent comment by Zarif that the bombed place in Tehran which might have had the population supporting opening up with the USA, post air strikes, the same support might have evaporated. In a way the point of disagreement of the reform camp with the USA has been that it was ruining the prospects of any rapprochement. The analysis of that resurgence of emphasis not just on Islamabad MoU, but also a complete overhaul is the whispering of what the political analysts in Tehran and elsewhere suspect of a soft coup taking place. The supreme leader is very much intact, so is the IRGC and the Parliament. However, there is the failure of the parliament to discuss the MOU under articles 75-77 of the Iranian constitution. Likewise, the preparedness of the armed forces is fast turning into the stalemate-triggered tiredness. No doubt every night data of Flight Radar 24 for the Middle East reveals that the preparedness of the US forces has not died down anywhere after the MOU. In fact many analysts argue that the level of refurbishment of war assets in the Gulf bases is indicative of another round of war or strikes against Iran. What is odd here is a somewhat different type of response observed from Tehran. The 'Artesh' or Army and the IRGC do not mince words to say that they are ready for the reply. However, it is a different atmosphere in the reformists' camp; who are giving vibes of finally foregoing the regime key commitments; the issue of Palestine, gradual acceptance of the Abraham Accords on some later date and consequent surrender of the resistance. The reformist president and foreign minister would like the Islamabad MoU to take the centrestage, but are constrained by the hard fact that the daily intel dossiers from the IRGC and Artesh paint a different picture, which practically justifies combat readiness on the part of the Iranian military. As the month of midterm primaries November closes in, the US administration is under pressure to cough up results; that can be either a 'Breaking News' regarding an agreement; a lasting agreement reached with Iran; which in the Tehrani interpretation means surrendering the positions held by the republic since 1979; precisely the strategic signaling by the Reformist Elders; namely Zarif and Khatami, to convince the USA that Iran is ready for surrender. The other way round, it can again be a quick escalation aimed at this time a complete regime changes with devastating repercussions for the Iranians. Given the fact that the number of stakeholders on the US side have increased on the back of regional developments; the pressure on Iran to make a deal like Camp David is as much as going for a decisive push precipitating a stalemate which is negotiated by Rezai; not Araghchi.