Two Things I learned from Duncan Forbes about Hume, and then give a bit of a twist.

I strongly suspect thatDuncan Forbes' book's,Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1975; my references are to the page-numbers in the reissue of 2010),high reputation, such as it is, is mostly due to its close association with 'Cambridge School contextualism' and perhaps a residue of fondness for the man's personality and teaching style. In my recent blogging I have been a bit critical of the book. Rather than close out my remarks on it with more criticism, I'd like to point to two interesting observations made during the course of his argument. They are related, and, while I am critical of Forbes, he gets something enduringly right about Hume, too. Thefirstis that for Hume the 'English owe their freedom to the Puritans.' (p. 264). In an accompanying note (p. 264 n.4), Forbes partially cites the following passage from Hume'sHistory: So absolute, indeed, was the authority of the crown [that is, Elizabeth I], that the precious spark of liberty had been kindled, and was preserved, by the puritans alone; and it was to this sect, whose principles appear so frivolous and habits so ridiculous, that the English owe the whole freedom of their constitution. Actuated by that zeal which belongs to innovators, and by the courage which enthusiasm inspires, they hazarded the utmost indignation of their sovereign; and employing all their industry to be elected into parliament; a matter not difficult, while a seat was rather regarded as a burthen than an advantage; they first acquired a majority in that assembly, and then obtained an ascendant over the church and monarchy. 40.41 Forbes cites the passage again on p. 269. And he evokes it (without citation) on p. 311. Forbes is right to alert the reader of this passage. And because Forbes' greatest strength is a certain reserve when it comes to stating the obvious, he does not comment on how striking it is that the great religious skeptic of the Northlands also has an eye for the role of a small band of religious enthusiasts and sectarians as the main spark and vector of liberty. There is a historically delicious snack here. Forbes is right to return repeatedly to the role of Puritanism in Hume'sHistory. However, in the explicit context of his argument, Forbes claims (based on the evidence of another passage in theHistory) that the role of Puritanism in generating freedom is something 'unaccountable' and 'altogether beyond the ken of the philosopher.' (p. 264). And here Forbes goes off the rails. Because in theHistory, Hume is echoing his early (1741) essay 'Of Superstition and Enthusiasm;' I quote Hume: Mythirdobservation on this head is,that superstition is an enemy to civil liberty, and enthusiasm a friend to it.As superstition groans under the dominion of priests, and enthusiasm is destructive of all ecclesiastical power, this sufficiently accounts for the present observation. Not to mention, that enthusiasm, being the infirmity of bold and ambitious tempers, is naturally accompanied with a spirit of liberty; as superstition, on the contrary, renders men tame and abject, and fits them for slavery. We learn from English history, that, during the civil wars, theindependentsanddeists, though the most opposite in their religious principles; yet were united in their political ones, and were alike passionate for a commonwealth. And since the origin ofwhigandtory, the leaders of thewhigshave either beendeistsor profestlatitudinariansin their principles; that is, friends to toleration, and indifferent to any particular sect ofchristians:While the sectaries, who have all a strong tincture of enthusiasm, have always, without exception, concurred with that party, in defence of civil liberty. (SE9, Mil 78-9; emphases in original) What's crucial about religious enthusiasm is that it creates a certain form of overconfidence, even zeal, and natural courage. And for Hume this is associatively correlated with the spirit of liberty. In the essay, Hume recognizes that enthusiasm (a species of false religion) can also be dangerous, at first, especially in power. So, he does not claim that religious enthusiasm always produces freedom. Now, I want to make two observations pertaining to this passage: the first pertains to Forbes' analysis, the second about the origin of toleration. So, first, while Forbes is familiar with the essay (he mentions it at least twice p. 152 & p. 214), he seems to have forgotten it in his analysis of theHistory. This is a shame because he, thereby, misses that Hume's account of Puritanism in the History had already beentheorizedand, in fact, partially anticipated in Hume's earliest essays. For Hume, enthusiasm is rooted in and an effect of the principles of human nature: 'Hope, pride, presumption, a warm imagination, together with ignorance, are, therefore, the true sources of Enthusiasm.' Now, Hume could be wrong about all of this. But Forbes is mistaken to claim that enthusiasm itself is for Hume somehow unaccountable. At this point a friend of Forbes may suggest (fairly) that I am being unfair to Forbes. All he is claiming is that the role of a religious sect in history is unaccountable because it is a small minority producing great historical effects. But that's actually not what Hume is saying. Here's the underlying passage from theHistorythat Forbes (p. 264 n. 3) relies on: But it is an observation, suggested by all history, and by none more than by that of James and his successor, that the religious spirit, when it mingles with faction, contains in it something supernatural and unaccountable; and that, in its operations upon society, effects correspond less to their known causes than is found in any other circumstance of government. A reflection, which may, at once, afford a source of blame against such sovereigns as lightly innovate in so dangerous an article, and of apology for such, as being engaged in an enterprize of that nature, are disappointed of the expected event, and fail in their undertakings. H 47.32 What Hume is saying here ishowthe effects of religious enthusiasm play out generates unpredictable effects relative to other social phenomena. But he is not claiming that the phenomenon itself is unknowable. In fact, when an outcome pattern is regularly disproportionate to its causes this itself becomes input in the art of government. As Adam Smith puts it (in 1759), 'The animosity of hostile factions, whether civil or ecclesiastical, is often still more furious than that of hostile nations; and their conduct towards one another is often still more atrocious.' (TMS 3.3.43, p. 155) And, in fact, this knowability is the very grounds of Hume's blame against those rulers that wish to innovate and steer religious enthusiasm. So, while it is true that the outcome of any given episode of faction mixing with enthusiasm is unknowable, Hume accounts for the cause and for thepattern of disproportion.1 Okay, so much for my criticism of Forbes. Second, note that in the passage quoted from 'Superstition and Enthusiasm,' Hume deviates here from the accounts now popular among Left and Right liberals about the origin of toleration. There is no mention here of fatigue with the atrocities of the European wars of religion. For Hume toleration is a by-product of a certain religious timidity (which is naturally associated with religious superstition). I will return to this material some other time because Hume's account of the origin of the preference for toleration, while unduly provocative to certain sensibilities, has more to say for it than the dogma of contemporary liberalism. Thesecondinteresting theme is something that Forbes first introduces on the sly. It occurs also in the context of his treatment of Hume's discussion of Elizabeth I's soft despotism. Here's Forbes (and quoting Hume): 'As a result, the people, secure in their property and not burdened with taxes, almost lost sight of their constitutional rights: 'the generality of the people, pleased with their easy situation, did not reflect upon the consequences'' (p. 255) At first this seems a rather mundane observation. But, as Forbes recognizes and notes, Hume is drawing a contrast between the many who do not reflect upon consequences, and the few who do! And as it happens the few that do, turn out to be the offspring of the very Puritans in parliament we just discussed! Let me quote one of Forbes' majestic summary passages (which itself quotes different passages from Hume'sHistory). I have highlighted the key bits: The leading members of the commons, 'men of an independent genius and large views,began to regulate their opinions more by the future consequences which they foresaw, than by the former precedents which were set before them; and they less aspired at maintaining the ancient constitution, than at establishing a new one, and a freer, and a better' (VI, 526-7). Hume emphasizes more than once not only the wealth but the foresight and intelligence and ability of the leaders of the House of Commons. 'The house of commons, we may observe, [in 1625] was almost entirely governed by a set of men of the most uncommon capacity,and the largest views: men who were now formed into a regular party and united ... by fixed aims and projects' (VII, 65. cf. also VI, 488-9, VII, 113, 115). These 'generous patriots' realized the need for regular government, they understood the spirit of the ageand so were able to see that the choicewould have to be between regular absolute monarchy on the continental model, as established in France by Richelieu, which meant entirely abandoning the privileges of the people, because 'it would be impossible, they thought, when all these pretensions were methodized, and prosecuted by the increasing knowledge of the age, to maintain any shadow of popular government', or regular liberty (VII, 66). They saw Charles making a regular system of the royal prerogatives (VII, 102-3). 'In this dilemma, men of such aspiring genius and such independent fortune could not long deliberate: they boldly embraced the side of freedom ... ' (VII, 66). (Forbes, p. 281) Rather than treating Hume as the social theorist of unintended consequences, which Forbes associates with Mandeville (p. 318), Forbes recognizes, correctly, that often Hume attributes to organized minorities political agency, who can discern (at least some of the) features of the future and act on this discernment. It's notable that Forbes fails to include the 'spirit of liberty' (H 46.30) that animates the 'men of genius' because it means he misses that for Hume religious enthusiasm is also a kind of glue, a coordinating function, among members of a sect. Yes, the 'plan' of liberty is itself offspring of the growth of commerce, and increasing knowledge (H 46.27), but the agency that makes it possible has, in part, a religious/enthusiastic origin. And, in part, it is the effect of their understanding the nature of political life (by these organized minorities). When Hume describes their 'uncommon capacity,' of the members of the house of commons, he writes: And as all human governments, particularly those of a mixed frame, are in continual fluctuation; it was as natural, in their opinion, and allowable, for popular assemblies to take advantage of favourable incidents, in order to secure the subject; as for monarchs, in order to extend their own authority. (H 50.10) We may say, then, that for Humetheirself-understanding ('their opinion') amounted to this: 'they received nothing from fortune except opportunity.' And Hume shows us why they succeeded. In fact, the real technical, underlying issue here is that the outcome patterns sometimes violate what Demeter andI have elsewhere (here) called 'Hume's ninth rule' (the proportionality between causes and effects).That violations of the ninth rule themselves are predictable in some areas of life is Hume's position; what effects these violations cause is not.