IAEA Says US-Saudi Nuclear Deal Nears Additional Protocol Standard

Rafael Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said at a press conference held in Vienna on September 7, 2026, that the civil nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia includes bilateral verification provisions whose scope approaches that of the Additional Protocol. The latter is the most intrusive instrument in the Agency's non-proliferation architecture, granting access to undeclared sites and allowing unannounced inspections. Saudi Arabia has not signed this instrument as part of the agreement, a matter separate from other files recently reviewed by the Agency, such as its assessment of Finland's readiness for nuclear and radiological emergencies. Two distinct legal instruments The agreement between Washington and Riyadh falls under the so-called "123 agreement" regime, pursuant to Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, which conditions the transfer of American nuclear technology and materials to a third country. It opens the way for Saudi reactors to be built using American technology and for greater involvement of US companies in the kingdom's nuclear program. This text is accompanied by a second instrument, a separate bilateral safeguards agreement, meant to govern the most sensitive activities. Both documents were signed by Chris Wright, US Secretary of Energy, and by Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, Saudi Minister of Energy. The Agency also continues to monitor other civil nuclear facilities, such as Switzerland's Beznau nuclear plant, which has returned to full capacity. According to Mr. Grossi, the bilateral safeguards agreement would introduce verification and monitoring authorizations judged to be close, on certain points, to those of the Additional Protocol, particularly for enrichment activities, the preceding conversion stage, and reprocessing capable of separating plutonium from spent fuel. A stronger standard not adopted This approach differs from the standard set by a previous 123 agreement signed by Washington with another Gulf state, under which the partner permanently and bindingly renounced enrichment and reprocessing — a renunciation often described as the "gold standard" in non-proliferation debates. Saudi Arabia has long refused to commit to this path, which partly explains the length of the negotiations, which began more than a decade ago and spanned several US administrations. The Iranian precedent The precedent most frequently cited by proponents of stronger requirements is Iran, which had voluntarily applied the Additional Protocol under an international agreement concluded with several major powers over its nuclear program. This voluntary application ended after the United States announced its withdrawal from that international agreement, illustrating the fragility of an enhanced verification regime when it rests on a broader diplomatic framework rather than a binding, standalone commitment. Evolution of Saudi Arabia's regulatory status Saudi Arabia's status with the IAEA has itself changed recently. The kingdom has had a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force for several years, but its application was long eased by a Small Quantities Protocol. This lighter protocol has now been renounced, bringing the Saudi verification regime closer to the common standard applicable to non-nuclear-weapon states.