Torkham Border Delays Highlight Pakistan's Trade Challenges

Delays and high costs at the Torkham border crossing highlight Pakistan's regional trade challenges, underscoring the need for transparent, route-level data to measure trade facilitation and improve connectivity beyond infrastructure development. How much does it cost to cross Pakistan's borders? A truck leaving Pakistan at Torkham in 2023 spent about 30 hours on the Pakistan side of the crossing, up from 24.2 hours a year earlier. Inbound trucks took 19.0 hours, up from 15.6. The crossing cost roughly $270 outbound and $183 inbound. These figures come from the CAREC Corridor Performance Measurement and Monitoring (CPMM) programme, supported by the Asian Development Bank, and they are unusual: few Pakistani trade routes have numbers like this in public. These are 2023 observations for one border crossing, not a measure of Pakistan's current national performance, but they demonstrate the kind of route-level evidence needed to assess trade facilitation. Torkham is not a CPEC project, and its trade flows are not a direct measure of CPEC performance. But it illustrates a wider challenge for Pakistan's regional connectivity agenda: the country tracks infrastructure projects, while comparable public evidence on the time and cost of moving goods across individual routes remains harder to find. Building a road is one achievement; making the entire trade journey faster and more predictable is another. That matters because CPEC Phase II identifies regional connectivity as one of its five corridors. Its purpose is to strengthen Pakistan's connections with regional markets and supply chains. The practical test is whether exporters and transporters can move goods more cheaply, quickly and predictably. A new highway cannot answer that question by itself. CPEC 2.0 will be judged, in the end, by whether regional trade through Pakistan gets cheaper, faster and more predictable. At present we can say how many kilometres have been built. Can anyone say what a consignment pays, and how long it waits, to cross? It would be wrong to blame customs alone. The CPMM case study lists nine agencies at Torkham, from Pakistan Customs and the National Logistics Cell to quarantine and anti-narcotics authorities. It also points to digital systems not fully integrated across them, cash payments for some fees, unreliable data connectivity, routine inspection of almost all consignments despite risk-management tools, sudden security closures, and little consultation with traders and freight forwarders. Each cause needs a different remedy. Lumped together as "delay", none can be fixed. Pakistan has not stood still. Pakistan Single Window has initiated a Time Release Study programme covering 18 trading ports, according to its FY2024–25 Annual Monitoring and Evaluation Report. The programme is planned to run from February 2025 to March 2028, in three phases. The report lists the study as ongoing. This is an important foundation, but it also highlights the need to translate measurement into action: route-level findings should identify the sources of delay, assign responsibility for corrective measures and allow progress to be tracked over time. My proposal is a Regional Connectivity Performance Framework. It is a way of joining up what exists, not a new bureaucracy. The framework should build on the existing Time Release Study programme and other available administrative data, while extending the analysis to the complete journey of a shipment where reliable information permits. Customs and the Single Window already time-stamp declarations, terminal systems record cargo movements, and CPMM offers a tested methodology. The framework would add a short survey of exporters, freight forwarders and transport operators, and report, for defined commodities on a defined route: border clearance time; waiting time by cause, where data allow; end-to-end shipment cost; variation in transit time, as a measure of reliability; system outages and closures; operator experience; and, for every bottleneck found, a named institution and a deadline. I suggest a 90-day pilot at one crossing, selected after comparing verified cargo volumes, trade relevance, data availability and the feasibility of inter-agency coordination. Torkham offers a documented baseline, but a China-facing crossing may be more directly relevant to CPEC; the choice should be evidence-led rather than predetermined. In the first month, the government would designate a lead through the CPEC coordination machinery the Planning Ministry already runs, and FBR, the Single Window, the Commerce Ministry and border agencies would agree on common indicators. In the second, existing data would be collected and validated, supplemented by the survey. In the third, the main bottlenecks would be identified, corrective actions assigned, and a short diagnostic published. The diagnostic should distinguish administrative delays from infrastructure, security and other operational constraints, so that each proposed remedy is assigned to the institution with the relevant authority. This is a recommendation, not a government commitment. Most of it is administrative. Extending data-sharing to other agencies may need notification by the Single Window's Governing Council, which the Act empowers it to do. Commercial confidentiality and security restrictions will limit what can be published; aggregated figures may have to do. I would promise no percentage reduction in cost or delay until a baseline exists. CPEC 2.0 will be judged, in the end, by whether regional trade through Pakistan gets cheaper, faster and more predictable. At present we can say how many kilometres have been built. Can anyone say what a consignment pays, and how long it waits, to cross? The writer is a Research Associate at the Centre of Excellence for CPEC, PID