Concordant or Yalta 2

Concordant or Yalta 2
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History rarely repeats itself neatly, but it loves to rhyme in the echoes of great power ambition. In 1945, Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin converged on a Crimean palace in Yalta to carve up a shattered postwar world. Today, the ghost of that summit hangs heavily over an unprecedented gathering in southern China: a historic trilateral encounter uniting the three most powerful figures on the global stage, Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Donald Trump. As these leaders assemble in Shenzhen with wildly divergent agendas, the world is forced to confront a sobering reality. Are we witnessing the dawn of a pragmatic grand strategy to stabilize a volatile, fractured planet, or are we sleepwalking into a modern Yalta—a cynical division of spheres of influence brokered at the expense of sovereign nations like Ukraine and Iran? To understand how we arrived at this pivotal crossroads, we must look backward nearly a decade to the grand-strategic architecture proposed by the late Henry Kissinger, and examine how the geopolitical chess board has shifted. The analysis on our syndicate was published by the Nation in Jan 2017, with the title “Kissinger’s Concordant and Trump”. Nearly ten years ago, as Donald Trump prepared for his first term, Henry Kissinger returned to global headlines promoting his “Concordant Policy on China.” Despite heavy skepticism from Western critics who argued that engagement with Beijing was dangerously naive, Kissinger maintained a timeless axiom of 19th-century Realpolitik: Always maintain a better relationship with both adversaries than they maintain with each other. Back in 2017, the international order was already fraying at the edges. The Middle East was shattered by conflicts spanning Libya, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan; a brewing crisis loomed over Eastern Europe; and regional alignments were shifting as countries across Asia recalibrated their ties. Kissinger’s prescription for this disorder was a “US-Russia-China Concordant”—a triangular strategic arrangement designed to prevent a permanent, unbreakable authoritarian axis between Moscow and Beijing by keeping Washington central to both. Fast forward to November 2027. After years of relentless escalation, devastating wars of attrition in Eastern Europe, and intractable Middle Eastern instability, the major powers appear exhausted by perpetual chaos. President Trump’s decision to cap off his Asia trip with a trilateral summit in Shenzhen, preceded by a crucial Quad security touchpoint in Manila with leaders like Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi represents the belated, high-stakes realization of Kissinger’s triangular logic. Michael Wilner’s latest peace in the Los Angeles Times is suggestive on how executing any peaceful initiative involves navigating a vastly different and far more perilous landscape. There are competing agendas in Shenzhen: The fundamental vulnerability of the Shenzhen summit lies in the starkly unbridgeable chasm between what each superpower leader wants out of the diplomatic theater: Washington’s Ambitions: Trump arrives aiming to tackle global stability, regional flashpoints, and nuclear nonproliferation. Yet, U.S. and foreign officials openly acknowledge that expectations are modest; the meeting is treated as an exploratory “entry point” rather than a venue for immediate grand bargains. While arms control advocates like Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association have urged practical guardrails—such as freezing nuclear arsenals, reaffirming testing moratoriums, and managing artificial intelligence risks in command-and-control systems—neither Moscow nor Beijing has shown genuine willingness to engage. Moscow’s Objectives: President Vladimir Putin leverages the summit to project undeniable global influence and normalize his standing, using the platform to push his terms on the war in Ukraine despite years of sweeping Western isolation. President Putin may also bring out the question on the war imposed on Iran and precondition it for resolving the crisis in Eastern Europe. Beijing’s Masterclass: President Xi Jinping has not displayed any cards on arms control or mediating a settlement for Kyiv. For Beijing, hosting a trilateral summit on Chinese soil is an unmitigated public relations victory. It projects China to the Global South as an indispensable, benevolent peacemaker, all while maintaining its strategic and economic lifeline to Moscow. The main question is whether the Summit can lay down a road map for terminating two regional wars, Russia-Ukraine and US/Israel-Iran. These two major wars have brought the world to the precipice of nuclear holocaust and have the potential to trigger the 3rd World War. The danger of a new partition: the deeper tragedy of this diplomatic gambit is who gets left off the ledger. Just as smaller European nations were marginalized at Yalta in 1945, modern geopolitics risks reducing sovereign states to bargaining chips in great-power negotiations. Furthermore, the optics of the American delegation itself underscore a changing world order. Accompanied by private tech titans whose satellite networks and technologies serve as critical digital sinews for modern warfare, traditional diplomacy increasingly rubs shoulders with techno-feudalism. Ultimately, the Shenzhen summit risks becoming a triumph of optics over substance, a high-stakes photo-op that yields few concrete breakthroughs on arms control while testing the structural integrity of Western alliances. If Kissinger’s vision was originally intended to split adversaries and preserve a rules-based international order, a poorly managed trilateral framework risks achieving the exact inverse. It threatens to institutionalize a multipolar world defined not by universal laws or democratic partnerships, but by raw might, transactional maneuvering, and the heavy ghosts of 1945. Adeela Naureen and Waqar K KauraviThe authors are freelance journalists. They can be reached at [email protected] and [email protected] Tags:

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