NINE employee associations representing thousands of workers from centres of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) recently came together to voice their concerns about the trajectory of India's space reforms. Their intervention was triggered by a statement from Pawan Goenka, chairman of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), that ISRO would eventually no longer manufacture launch vehicles or undertake routine satellite work.
He said private companies or public sector undertakings would handle those activities. At the same time, ISRO would concentrate on special-purpose satellites, scientific research and new technologies for transfer to industry.
The employees' response was unambiguous: private participation in defined commercial activities can operate alongside a strong, publicly owned ISRO. What requires debate, they argued, is a policy that could reduce ISRO to a residual research and development organisation while the actual production of launch vehicles and operation of launch infrastructure move out of public hands.
The concern is not entirely without context. On June 10, IN-SPACe invited expressions of interest to transfer the technology of ISRO's most powerful rocket, the LVM3, to the private sector. On August 11, it invited expressions of interest to operate the small rocket launch centre ISRO is building at Kulasekarapattinam (Tamil Nadu). Both invitations excluded public sector enterprises. This raises a basic question: should such enterprises be prevented from competing simply because the stated objective is to promote private participation?
ISRO has sought to allay these fears, calling reports of its dismantling 'baseless' and saying that it will neither be privatised nor have its importance diminished. The stated objective, it says, is to expand India's space ecosystem through reform.
However, a more fundamental problem needs attention: ISRO's capacity is being stretched. Reports of experienced scientists and engineers leaving the organisation have emerged, even as recruitment has slowed. The gap between sanctioned posts and actual recruitment, which was relatively small in the 2000s, is now approaching 30 per cent. This means ISRO is operating with only about two-thirds of its sanctioned workforce, much of it scientific and technical. Many senior employees are also approaching retirement. The fear that ISRO is being allowed to bleed to death is not unfounded.
Staff leaving ISRO is not a new phenomenon. Engineers left during the Gulf boom of the 1980s and the IT boom of the 1990s. But the present situation is different. Private space companies are now poaching experienced personnel in areas that overlap with ISRO's own capabilities: rocketry, navigation, telemetry, propulsion and systems engineering.
This comes at a difficult time. India is planning a substantial increase in satellite launches for civilian and military needs. Between 2025 and 2040, nearly 130 satellite launches are anticipated. Further, ISRO is simultaneously expected to deliver ambitious missions such as Gaganyaan and Chandrayaan-4. It is clear that ISRO's current rate of just five launches per year cannot meet the launch manifest. Overall launch capacity must increase.
But does this necessarily mean ISRO should withdraw entirely from manufacturing and launch operations? One important fact is often missing from this debate. ISRO has never manufactured every part of its rockets. Industry has been deeply involved in launch-vehicle production for decades. By 2000, Indian industry had already undertaken 80-90 per cent of the manufacturing of mature launch vehicles. ISRO retains only the vital responsibilities of quality assurance, space-worthiness testing, and crucial assembly and integration.
The issue, therefore, is not whether private industry should participate. It already does. The real question is where the boundary between public capability and private participation should lie.
Recent launch failures make this question more important. When failures are linked, at least allegedly, to supplier-side quality-control problems, simply shifting more responsibility to private industry is not automatically the solution. Quality assurance and accountability continue to remain essential, particularly when strategic and civilian requirements depend on these systems.
There is also a financial question. ISRO's former chairman S Somanath has argued that its budget needs to rise substantially from around Rs 14,000 crore to about Rs 25,000 crore to meet India's expanding requirements. Much of the projected satellite programme serves civilian and military needs rather than commercial markets. Thus, markets will not fund it. If the government cannot find the money for ISRO, how does it expect to compensate private industry for these civilian launches? Shifting end-to-end operations to the private sector will not solve this logjam.
IN-SPACe was conceived primarily as a facilitator and regulator for private participation, just like the DGCA in the civil aviation sector. But IN-SPACe is now transferring ISRO-built assets and technology to private industry and appears to be acting as a de facto asset-divestment channel. The proposed Space Activities Bill, first drafted in 2017 and revised in 2025, also needs proper parliamentary and public discussion.
Reforming ISRO is one thing. Dismantling parts of a national scientific institution without a transparent discussion is quite another. If the objective is genuinely to strengthen India's space capabilities, there is no reason to fear debate. The real danger is that ISRO may wither away incrementally, without Parliament, scientists, employees and the public having a meaningful say.
India certainly needs a vibrant private space industry. But vibrant private-sector participation does not require a weakened public space agency. That is why the present debate should not be reduced to a choice between 'ISRO versus private industry'. The more important questions are what scale of space economy India hopes to build in the coming years and what kind of space capability it wants to retain in public hands.
TV Venkateswaran is visiting professor, IISER-Mohali
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