The absence of a lustration law threatens Kosovo's national security

A new wave of crackdowns on Serbian espionage networks, from the 'Sheholli' case to the arrest of seven people accused of cooperating with the Serbian Secret Service, has once again raised the alarm over national security in Kosovo. At the center of the debate is a delicate question of the transition: Is the country suffering the consequences of justice delayed because of the absence of a Lustration Law? Të lidhura None found While other post-communist countries purged the state apparatus by preventing former collaborators of repressive regimes from holding public office, the Republic of Kosovo has yet to resolve this complex issue. More than twenty years after the end of the conflict, Kosovo's society continues to face an extremely sensitive question: how should individuals who collaborated with the mechanisms of former regimes be identified and managed? This issue, neglected for a long time, is once again receiving the institutions' full attention. In the countries of Eastern Europe, this historic wound was addressed through the so-called 'Lustration Laws.' These legal instruments operated as an official filter, automatically barring people with proven links to the repressive apparatuses of the past from seeking key public positions. According to Gurakuq Kuçi, a security expert, lustration laws were specifically designed to screen people who collaborated with former regimes, and this is a typically post-communist issue. A major obstacle remains the lack of documentation. After the Serbian administration withdrew from the territory of Kosovo, a significant portion of the archives and records of the secret services was moved abroad. Without indisputable facts, such an initiative risks degenerating into political confrontation or accusations based solely on rumors. Despite this, the body of evidence is expanding. The Institute for Crimes Committed During the War in Kosovo, established in 2023, is tasked with collecting, authenticating and organizing evidence. By 2026, the institution reported that it had collected more than 400 linear meters of physical documents and over 20 terabytes of digital data from approximately 650 sources in 14 different countries. Nevertheless, Gurakuqi emphasizes that a law drafted without complete documentation would turn into a form of persecution based on rumors or political motives, without solid arguments. Documentation alone is not sufficient. An effective lustration law must set clear boundaries: what constitutes collaboration, which positions are affected and what level of evidence is required. The Venice Commission insists on full procedural safeguards, including the right to a defense, access to evidence, the opportunity to challenge it and the right to appeal to an independent court. Lustration, therefore, cannot be reduced to a simple list of names; it requires an individual process firmly grounded in evidence. The role of the justice system is also decisive. The OSCE report made public in July 2026 notes progress in the investigation of war crimes, but at the same time highlights shortcomings in the handling of evidence, protracted proceedings and weaknesses in respecting procedural safeguards. This also reflects Kosovo's dilemma: how can it confront the past without creating a new mechanism of injustice? Kosovo has not followed the typical path of transitioning from communism to democracy. It has experienced war, been under international administration and gone through a prolonged state-building process. For this reason, a model copied from abroad does not necessarily constitute an adequate solution. Does Kosovo therefore need a lustration law? The answer may be yes, but only if it is built on four fundamental pillars: reliable documentation, strict verification, clearly defined legal standards and an independent body that makes individual decisions.