On January 15, 2009, Captain Sully Sullenberger transmitted six words to New York TRACON that became the most recognized radio call in modern commercial aviation: "We're gonna be in the Hudson." Three minutes earlier, US Airways Flight 1549 had departed LaGuardia Airport (LGA) with 155 people on board. A flock of Canada geese struck both engines simultaneously at 2,818 feet (859 meters), leaving the Airbus A320 without thrust over one of the most densely populated areas in the United States. Sullenberger ditched the aircraft in the Hudson River. Everyone survived.
Nearly two decades later, the event is still referenced in pilot training, engine certification discussions, and airport wildlife management programs. Bird strikes have not decreased since 2009. They have tripled. The FAA recorded a record 24,447 wildlife strikes in 2025, roughly 67 per day, despite more than $400 million in airport wildlife management investment since Flight 1549.
What Happened On January 15, 2009
US Airways Flight 1549 departed LaGuardia Airport (LGA) in New York at approximately 3:25 PM Eastern Time on January 15, 2009, bound for Charlotte Douglas International Airport (CLT). The aircraft was an Airbus A320-214, registration N106US, powered by two CFM56-5B4/P engines. Captain Chesley Sullenberger, 57, was in the left seat with approximately 20,000 flight hours. First Officer Jeffrey Skiles, 49, was in the right seat and was flying the departure leg. The aircraft carried 150 passengers and 5 crew members.
At approximately 2,818 feet (859 meters) above ground level, roughly 90 seconds after takeoff, the aircraft flew through a flock of Canada geese. Multiple birds entered both engines simultaneously. The flight data recorder showed both engines losing thrust within seconds of the strike. Skiles immediately began attempting to restart the engines using the dual engine failure checklist while Sullenberger took control of the aircraft. At 3:27 PM, Sullenberger transmitted to New York TRACON departure control: "Hit birds. We've lost thrust on both engines. We're turning back towards LaGuardia." Seconds later, after assessing the aircraft's altitude, speed, and distance from available airports, he transmitted the six words that became the most recognized radio call in modern commercial aviation: "We're gonna be in the Hudson."
Sullenberger guided the aircraft to a wings-level touchdown on the Hudson River at approximately 3:31 PM, roughly 208 seconds after the bird strike. The aircraft remained intact and floated. Passengers evacuated onto the wings and through the forward doors onto deployed evacuation slides that doubled as life rafts. The water temperature was approximately 36-41°F (2-5°C). Ferry boats operating on the Hudson reached the aircraft within minutes, pulling passengers from the wings and rafts before hypothermia could set in. All 155 people on board survived. Sullenberger was the last person off the aircraft after walking the cabin twice to confirm it was empty. The NTSB investigation concluded that the dual engine failure was caused by the ingestion of multiple Canada geese into both engines, exceeding the bird ingestion certification standard the engines were designed to meet.
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Bird Strikes And The Miracle On The Hudson: Test Your Knowledge
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What The FAA Changed After Flight 1549
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The FAA and the aviation industry responded to Flight 1549 with the largest investment in airport wildlife management in the history of US aviation. Since 2009, more than $400 million has been directed toward wildlife-related airport improvement projects, including habitat modification, detection systems, and operational changes at Part 139 certificated airports across the country. An additional $30 million has been invested in research and development of detection and avoidance technologies including avian radar, bird migration forecasting, and aircraft lighting systems designed to make aircraft more visible to birds during approach and departure.
The FAA expanded its wildlife hazard assessment requirements for airports. Under 14 CFR Part 139, airports that have experienced a wildlife strike resulting in engine ingestion, a wildlife strike causing significant damage, or a wildlife strike creating a significant hazard to aircraft must conduct a formal Wildlife Hazard Assessment and develop a Wildlife Hazard Management Plan. The assessments are conducted over a 12-month period to capture seasonal variation in bird activity and must be updated when conditions change. Before 2009, the enforcement and scope of these assessments was less rigorous. The FAA also increased reporting requirements, encouraging pilots and airport operators to submit wildlife strike reports through the National Wildlife Strike Database, which has grown from a few thousand entries per year in the early 1990s to over 24,000 in 2025.
On the engine certification side, the FAA and EASA reviewed the bird ingestion standards that commercial turbofan engines must meet before entering service. Under 14 CFR 33.76, engines are required to demonstrate that they can ingest a single 4 lb (1.8 kg) bird and continue operating, and that they can safely shut down without catastrophic failure after ingesting an 8 lb (3.6 kg) bird. The standards were not designed to cover simultaneous ingestion of multiple large birds into both engines, which is what happened on Flight 1549. Post-accident reviews examined whether the standards should be raised to reflect the reality that flocks of large birds represent a credible threat, but no change to the weight thresholds has been implemented. The primary mitigation strategy remains keeping birds away from the aircraft rather than building engines that can ingest them.
How Airports Try To Keep Birds Away From Runways
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Airport wildlife management programs operate year-round at every Part 139 certificated commercial airport in the United States. The programs are a combination of habitat modification, active deterrents, and lethal control managed by USDA Wildlife Services biologists stationed at major airports under cooperative agreements with airport authorities. The goal is to make the airport environment as unattractive to birds as possible and to disperse any birds that arrive before they interfere with aircraft operations.
Habitat modification is the first line of defense. Airports manage vegetation height to eliminate cover and nesting sites, typically maintaining grass at 7-14 inches (18-36 cm) to discourage ground-nesting species while remaining too tall for species that prefer short-cropped fields. Standing water is drained or filled because it attracts waterfowl. Retention ponds required for stormwater management are covered with netting or wire grids to prevent birds from landing. Fruit-bearing trees and shrubs that attract feeding flocks are removed from airport property and, where possible, from adjacent land under wildlife management easements. The objective is to eliminate the food, water, and shelter that draw birds to the airfield in the first place.
When birds arrive despite the habitat management, airports deploy active deterrents. Pyrotechnic cartridges fired from handheld launchers produce loud bangs that scatter flocks. Propane cannons generate periodic explosions at programmable intervals. Trained border collies patrol runways and taxiways to chase birds, exploiting the instinctive prey response that makes birds flee from a running canine predator. Several airports including Chicago O'Hare (ORD), Boston Logan (BOS), and Southwest Florida International (RSW) use falconry programs where trained raptors are flown over the airfield to establish a predator presence that discourages other birds from settling. Canada geese present a specific challenge because they are federally protected under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which limits the lethal control options available to airport managers without specific USDA depredation permits. Geese also adapt to non-lethal deterrents over time, habituating to sounds, lights, and even dogs that initially dispersed them effectively.
How Common Bird Strikes Actually Are
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The FAA's National Wildlife Strike Database recorded 24,447 wildlife strikes against civil aircraft in the United States in 2025, a 9.3% increase over the 22,371 reported in 2024. That works out to approximately 67 strikes per day, or one for every 806 flights. The reported strike rate at Part 139 certificated airports reached a record 47.23 per 100,000 aircraft movements in 2025, more than three times the 12.72 rate recorded in 2000. Since the database was established in 1990, more than 319,000 wildlife strikes have been reported in the United States, resulting in 82 fatalities and 126 aircraft destroyed. Globally, wildlife strikes have killed more than 643 people and destroyed over 360 aircraft between 1990 and 2024.
The rising numbers reflect several factors working simultaneously. Resident Canada goose populations in North America have grown substantially since the 1970s due to successful conservation programs and the species' adaptation to urban and suburban habitats including airports, golf courses, and parks. The US Fish and Wildlife Service estimates the resident population now exceeds several million. Modern high-bypass turbofan engines are quieter than older engines, giving birds less audible warning of an approaching aircraft. Air traffic has increased, putting more aircraft in the sky at the altitudes where most bird strikes occur. And reporting compliance has improved since the FAA began encouraging voluntary strike reports and making the database more accessible, meaning a portion of the increase reflects better data collection rather than a genuine increase in strike frequency.
The majority of strikes cause no damage. Approximately 54% of bird strikes occur between July and October when young birds have recently fledged and fall migration is underway. About 61% of strikes with fixed-wing aircraft occur during landing phases and 36% during takeoff and climb. Wings and engines are the components most frequently damaged, each accounting for 25% of all damaged aircraft components since 1990. The FAA's research has established a direct relationship between bird body mass and the probability of aircraft damage: for every additional 100 grams of body mass, the likelihood of damage increases by approximately 1.13%. A European starling at 2-3 ounces (57-85 grams) rarely causes significant damage. A Canada goose at 6-14 lb (2.7-6.4 kg) can destroy an engine.
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