Why China Has Revived Package Deal Idea

In the lead-up to President Xi Jinping's anticipated visit to India for the BRICS summit, China has reintroduced a proposal aimed at resolving the longstanding border dispute between the two nations. This strategic initiative, referred to as the "Package solution" , again emerged following the 25th round of Special Representatives' (India's NSA Ajit Doval and Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi) talks, although it received limited attention from strategic community. The timing of this proposal is noteworthy, as it coincides with Xi Jinping's upcoming visit, highlighting its potential significance in diplomatic discussions. While India has agreed to Chinese proposal of ' expert group mechanism on boundary delimitation and working group on border management under the WMCC ( working mechanism for consultation and coordination on border affairs) which would respectively advance discussions on early and substantial harvest of boundary delimitation and border management,' more significant proposal seems to be revival of Package Solution idea, which India seems to have tentatively accepted. While China has opted to label the initiative as a " package Solution," the Indian press release characterizes it as a "political settlement." This divergence in terminology reflects India's cautious approach, given its previous rejections of similar package deals. This change may stem from India's historical resistance to package deal offers, suggesting a careful navigation of diplomatic language as both countries seek to address the border issue. In 1959, China introduced the package proposal approach to resolve border delimitation and territorial disputes during Prime Minister Zhou En Lai's visit to New Delhi. He suggested to Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru that both countries agree to a territory swap, allowing China to retain Aksai Chin while India would maintain control over NEFA, now known as Arunachal Pradesh, and other regions in Ladakh. However, Nehru, facing significant opposition and pressure from his own party, rejected the proposal, asserting India's recognition of the Johnson Line of 1865, which designated the mountainous terrain as part of Jammu and Kashmir, subsequently integrated into India in 1947. Zhou countered by referencing the McCartney-MacDonald line of 1893, which depicted Aksai Chin as under Chinese jurisdiction and was acknowledged by the Qing emperor. India's refusal to cede Aksai Chin and NEFA to China ultimately contributed to the outbreak of the 1962 war. During this conflict, Chinese forces retreated to the McMahon Line, established in 1913 through a tripartite agreement involving India, China and Tibet, which China later repudiated. Notably, following the ceasefire in 1962, Chinese troops vacated the Tawang area and repositioned behind the McMahon-defined border, reflecting the complexities and tensions surrounding the territorial disputes between the two nations. ALSO READ: OPINION | How China Is Preparing To Deal With IAF Rafales Over the years, discussions with Chinese scholars and think tank experts have consistently indicated that the Tawang region, if ceded to China, would appease their demands. This perspective reflects the Chinese government's preconditions for resolving border disputes, which have been communicated to Indian representatives. Notably, this shift in Chinese demands is evident, as Tawang was not included in earlier negotiations, such as those between Zhou En Lai and Nehru or during Deng Xiaoping's discussions with Atal Behari Vajpayee in 1979. Currently, Chinese experts assert that ceding parts of Ladakh is also necessary for a comprehensive resolution of the border issue. The evolving Chinese stance reveals an expansion of their territorial claims, as they now seek to alter the status quo regarding Arunachal Pradesh. Specifically, they demand that India relinquish the Tawang area along with additional territories in Ladakh, marking a significant departure from the positions articulated in 1959 by Zhou En Lai. This escalation in demands has contributed to a stalemate in Sino-Indian border negotiations, leading to significant confrontations such as the Dokalam standoff in 2017 and the ongoing tensions in Eastern Ladakh since 2020, despite formal agreements to disengage. Interestingly, the concept of a package deal was revisited during Vajpayee's visit to Beijing in 1979, when Deng Xiaoping proposed a territorial exchange to resolve the dispute. Regarding this meeting Deng wrote, ' When I met foreign minister in 1979, I put forward a 'package solution' to the problem. If both countries make some concessions, it will be settled. Because this question has a long history, you have to take into account the feelings of your people, and we also have to take into account the feelings of our people. But if the two sides agree to the 'package solution', they should be able to convince their people.' Later when Deng met Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi in 1988 , he again reiterated, 'We do some compromise on the West wing, you do some on the East wing, then we can have a new border.'' ALSO READ: OPINION | Would Xi Permit Elephant And Dragon To Dance On LAC? The refusal to accept territory exchanges under a package deal, from Nehru to Vajpayee to Rajeev Gandhi highlights a bipartisan consensus in India regarding Aksai Chin's status as Indian territory. This stance has prompted China to strengthen its military presence, leading to heightened tensions and incursions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), as well as an expansion of its aggressive claims in Ladakh. Consequently, both nations have mobilized thousands of troops and developed extensive military infrastructure, necessitating significant financial resources for maintenance. China appears to be employing pressure tactics to caution India that unresolved border issues will result in ongoing military deployments, incurring substantial costs and perpetuating instability along the LAC, which remains undefined. Since the incursions began in May 2020, China has refused to withdraw over 60,000 troops from Eastern Ladakh, with both sides maintaining significant military forces despite agreements for disengagement and de-induction anticipated in July, 2020. By omitting any commitment to the early withdrawal of forces from Eastern Ladakh in the eight-point consensus, China signals that the entire LAC may face similar military deployments. While India seeks the prompt de-induction of forces, the Chinese People's Liberation Army has further solidified its presence through the establishment of new military infrastructure, including weapon storage facilities. China's recent expansion of its territorial demands complicates ongoing border negotiations. The situation has been further exacerbated by the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and China's consolidation of control over the Shaksgam Valley, which was originally part of Jammu and Kashmir that merged with India. This shift in territorial dynamics poses significant challenges to India's position in the region. ALSO READ: OPINION | India Can Counter MECCA, But US Playing With Fire Concerns All In response to China's assertive military and economic posture, India has bolstered its military presence along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). However, this military build-up is placing considerable strain on the Indian economy, prompting leaders to reconsider the sustainability of such a stance in the long term. The economic implications of maintaining a heavy military presence are becoming increasingly difficult for India to manage. Chinese leaders often advocate for elephant- dragon dance , suggesting that cooperation between India and China could yield mutual benefits and enhance the welfare of both the people. If both nations can find a mutually acceptable resolution, they have the potential to emerge as global leaders. This perspective aligns with Wang Yi's assertion that a stable China-India relationship serves the fundamental interests of both nations and holds significant global implications. To realize this objective, China must regard India not as a threat or strategic rival, but rather as a strategic partner, collaboratively fostering global growth and serving as a joint engine for development. In India, there is a growing consensus that the proposals put forth by Zhou in 1959 and Deng in 1979 are open to negotiation; however, any attempts to alter the terms or adopt a more rigid stance will not persuade India to relinquish territories currently under its control to China. (Ranjit Kumar is a senior journalist and strategic affairs analyst.)