Why India should keep its SCO seat

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit is one of the most unusual rooms that India sits in. On the table are China and Pakistan, two of India's most difficult security relationships. There is Russia, an increasingly complicated but longstanding partner. Then Iran and the Central Asian republics that India has spent more than a decade trying to draw closer..Given that the outcomes from the recent Bishkek Declaration were also underwhelming, concerns around the SCO's relevance for India have only grown more salient. After all, it has not delivered much. On terrorism, there has been little meaningful action. Then there is the cost to India's relationship with the West. So New Delhi's participation in the SCO has always generated an uncomfortable question: What exactly is it doing in an organisation whose strategic centre of gravity is skewed towards China?.Nearly a decade after India became a full member in 2017, the answer remains confounding. Its members disagree profoundly over security, connectivity and the international order. China possesses overwhelming weight within the grouping, while Pakistan's membership makes any meaningful cooperation on terrorism difficult. India has also consistently refused to endorse China's Belt and Road Initiative, setting it apart from the other members..SCO summit: PM Modi takes dig at Pakistan on terrorism; Sharif hits out at India over Indus Waters Treaty.Yet these are arguments for India to manage its participation carefully, not reasons for relinquishing its seat. The strategic value of the SCO lies less in what the organisation can do for India than in what India would gain or lose by remaining outside it..The first reason is geography. For all the attention India devotes to the Indo-Pacific, it is simultaneously a continental power whose security and economic interests extend deep into Eurasia. Afghanistan, Iran, and the five Central Asian republics matter to India for energy, critical minerals, and the regional balance of power. China and Russia have a geographical advantage. They share long borders with Central Asia and have retained decades-old political and infrastructural networks, neither of which India enjoys..New Delhi has tried to overcome this structural weakness over the past few years. The Connect Central Asia Policy of 2012 was followed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to all five Central Asian republics in 2015, India's accession to the SCO in 2017, the India-Central Asia Dialogue from 2019 and the first India-Central Asia leaders' summit in 2022..Leaving the SCO would therefore run contrary to more than a decade of Indian policy designed to overcome the problem of limited access. Of course, the SCO is not India's only route to Central Asia. India should continue developing bilateral relationships and the International North-South Transport Corridor independently of the organisation..The second reason is China. At first glance, growing Chinese influence within the SCO may seem like an argument for Indian disengagement, but an Indian exit would not weaken the SCO or diminish Beijing's role within it. It would simply produce an organisation in which China faces fairly no opposition..More importantly, full membership gives India agency. The SCO operates by consensus. Under its charter, decisions are adopted only when no member state objects. This means New Delhi cannot simply be treated as an observer while others define collective positions in its name..India's refusal to endorse the Belt and Road Initiative demonstrates the utility of this arrangement. New Delhi has been able to remain inside the organisation while withholding support from a flagship Chinese initiative that it believes violates nations' sovereignty..The third reason is security. The SCO began primarily as a regional security organisation, and counterterrorism remains one of its few areas with a permanent institutional mechanism. Its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure in Tashkent provides a standing platform for cooperation among member states..One cannot exaggerate what this structure delivers. The presence of Pakistan ensures that the SCO is unlikely to adopt India's preferred interpretation of cross-border terrorism. But the political stability of Afghanistan, extremist networks, narcotics routes and emerging terrorist financing channels affect India directly. The return of the Taliban has only increased the importance of continued engagement with Central Asian security establishments..India gains little by staying out of a regional security forum simply because some of its members are adversaries. New Delhi should become more demanding about what it receives from membership..India should use the next phase of its participation to push a narrow agenda in areas where cooperation is both possible and useful. For example, modernising counterterrorism cooperation through RATS, digitalising customs and transit procedures, improving disaster-response coordination, and creating stronger professional and educational links with Central Asia. Therefore, despite its disappointments, the SCO still holds strategic value for India..(The writer is a Research Analyst, Geostrategy Programme, The Takshashila Institution).(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.)