What economic model can Europe afford?

Europe has a competitiveness problem. Politicians, economists, industry, and investors have been repeating it for several years. The reports of the European Commission say it, European leaders say it, and the figures confirm it. And society as a whole is questioning it. But perhaps this is no longer the right question. The more uncomfortable question is: 'what economic model can Europe afford?' A model built over decades on relatively affordable energy, global trade, efficient supply chains, extensive social protection, regulation, and the green transition. A model that could assume that strategic security was, to a large extent, guaranteed from outside. Today, almost every one of these premises is under pressure. Europe wants cheaper energy. It wants decarbonization. It wants competitive industry. It wants rearmament. It wants social protection. It wants strategic autonomy. It wants massive investment in technology. And at the same time, it wants fiscal discipline. And all of these are legitimate objectives. But the problem is that they all cost money. And Europe has to finance them almost simultaneously. This is where the real competitiveness problem begins. The European debate has remained captive for too long to a formula that has become insufficient: more innovation, more efficiency, better regulation, and thus more growth. Of course, Europe (meaning the European Union) needs all of these. But the world in which the European economy operates has changed. Europe is no longer competing only for markets. It is competing for energy, capital, technologies, raw materials, and industrial capacity. Ultimately, it is competing for security. And this change is forcing Europe to rethink the very definition of competitiveness. Because what was considered efficient yesterday can become vulnerable today. A very cheap supply chain, but dependent on a single supplier, is efficient. But it is not resilient. A very cheap energy source, but dependent on a geopolitically vulnerable route, may reduce costs. But it does not provide security. A high-performing industry, but dependent on technologies, raw materials, or components produced outside Europe, may be competitive under normal conditions. Until normal conditions disappear. Efficiency without resilience can become vulnerability. This is one of the great geopolitical and geo-economic lessons of recent years. And it explains why Brussels is beginning to place in the same equation things that, until not long ago, were discussed separately: competitiveness, energy, defense, industry, innovation, economic security, and strategic autonomy. It is not a coincidence. It is the new European economy. The EU must invest more in things it considered almost guaranteed until yesterday: security, energy infrastructure, industrial capacity, technology, defense, and resilient supply chains. At the same time, however, it must finance the green transition, social infrastructure, and a social protection model that citizens are not willing to abandon. This is where the political tension arises. Citizens want affordable prices and good public services. Industry wants competitive energy. Investors want predictability. States want fiscal space. Brussels wants decarbonization. NATO wants defense. Europe wants competitiveness. There is nothing absurd about these objectives. It becomes absurd to assume that we can achieve them without making choices, without prioritizing, and without changing the way we invest. That is why Europe must move from the question 'how much does it cost?' to the question 'what do we risk if we do not do it?' How much does a robust electricity grid cost? More than an undersized one. But how much does an industrial economy affected by power outages, bottlenecks, or external dependencies cost? How much does defense cost? A lot. But how much does vulnerability cost? How much does securing supply chains cost? More than buying the cheapest product available. But how much does production disruption cost when the supplier disappears? This is the logic of the resilience economy. And it also changes the definition of investment. A robust electricity grid is not just energy infrastructure. It is economic infrastructure. An LNG terminal is not just a gas facility. It is strategic insurance. A semiconductor factory is not just an industrial investment. It is technological capacity. A missile defense system is not just military expenditure. It protects economic infrastructure. A secure data center is not just technology. It is strategic infrastructure. Security is beginning to become productive. This may be where the most important paradigm shift lies. The EU does not have to choose between competitiveness and security. It must learn to turn security into a source of competitiveness. Investments in energy can reduce industrial costs. Investments in grids can eliminate bottlenecks. Investments in defense can accelerate technologies with civilian applications. Investments in artificial intelligence can increase productivity. Investments in critical raw materials can reduce dependencies. European infrastructure can better integrate the Single Market. But to do this, the EU must solve an old problem: speed. Europe does not lack ideas. It lacks scaling. It does not lack research. It lacks the transformation of research into products and global companies. It does not lack entrepreneurs. It lacks the conditions for them to remain and grow in Europe. An investor can tolerate a tax. They can also tolerate regulation. What they find much harder to tolerate is uncertainty. If authorizing an investment takes years, capital leaves. If energy is too expensive, production leaves. If the rules are constantly changing, investments become riskier. Capital does not wait for Europe.That is why reforming the Single Market and administrative simplification are not technical matters. They are economic security instruments. Europe cannot build strategic autonomy through 27 fragmented markets and 27 different administrative speeds. It needs scale. Capital. Energy. Infrastructure. Technology. Industrial capacity. And the ability to make decisions quickly. Europe spent decades optimizing efficiency. Now it must learn to optimize resilience. This does not mean abandoning the market economy. It means adapting it to a world in which geopolitical risk has become an economic variable. The old model was simple: efficiency, lower costs, competitiveness. The model taking shape is different: resilience, security, investment, productivity, competitiveness. This is not a renunciation of efficiency. It is a correction of it. Because an economy that produces cheaply but cannot produce during a crisis is not truly competitive. It is merely temporarily efficient. And Europe no longer has the luxury of time. So, the question is no longer whether it can preserve its economic model. The question is whether it can reinvent it before the world makes it irrelevant.