Why new airline security protocols are a must, no questions axed

As danger lurks inside cockpits now, all possibilities must be considered — and prevented While no amount of praise is enough for what Capt Smit Machchhar did to save 180 passengers on the FlyDubai flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv on Wednesday, the huge implications for all air passengers must now be considered. Though co-pilot Hamam al Hammami did not succeed in engineering a major tragedy like what happened on September 11, 2001, the ramifications of his foiled attempt are significant in an era when air travel is a necessity, not an indulgence. Since 2001, air passenger numbers have rocketed from 1.7 billion to over 4.5 billion annually, with a brief dip during the pandemic years. It would not be an exaggeration to posit that these numbers now make this segment a preferred target of all sorts of terror groups. Particularly since airport security protocols are not of the same standard everywhere in the world and many tend to become lax once threat perceptions wane. Until and unless something like this happens. The country with the highest threat perception is, of course, Israel. For obvious reasons. But it is also a nation on perpetual high alert. Almost all its citizens are military-trained, either serving or veterans and reservists. Unlike citizens of most other nations, Israelis are all well versed in what to do in case of crises like terror attacks. Given their preparedness, being able to crash and kill a planeload of them would have been regarded as a major victory for jihadi organisations. More from Opinion More from Opinion Ominously, India is also a major target for jihadi attacks. Importantly, India now has the third-largest domestic aviation market in the world, at approximately 4.2 per cent of the global pie. Of course, India is still very far behind the first and second — the US and China at 18 per cent and 16.7 per cent respectively — but its attractiveness as a terror target is on par with at least the US. The population is also diverse in every respect and not homogeneous like Israel. So, the threats are multifarious too. After the foiled FlyDubai crash, relevant sections of the Indian government must now be brainstorming about the precautions that need to be taken. Just like every other country in the world. Travel has not been the same after 9/11 and we are all used to the protocols now, including cockpit doors being locked from the inside. But the actions of the radicalised Omani FlyDubai co-pilot have demonstrated that crucial upgrades are imperative, no matter how annoying they may be. Common sense dictates that there should be stronger vetting and monitoring of airline crews: hijackers need not necessarily be sneaking aboard as passengers. Radicalisation is hard to discern unless crews are watched over for a long time. Only then can any changes in behaviour or interests be noticed. There must be different security protocols for the cockpit now, with ways to override actions deemed detrimental to planes, to prevent forcible crashes or sabotage. The fact that even the eagle-eyed Israelis missed Al Hammami's red flags, including his previous record with other aviation companies, his suspicious behaviour and internet activity, shows how vulnerable all nations are to long-term planning by jihadis. Whether acting as lone wolves or part of a larger conspiracy, these elements clearly know how to stay off the radar. Suspicion must be the default principle to fend off such 'new' advances in jihadi terror plans. Security drills passengers routinely go through now at airports are post-facto anyway: initiated after major disasters revealed systemic loopholes. After the 1988 Lockerbie crash, baggage is intensively screened and only loaded on planes when the passenger is on board. Post 9/11, carrying sharp objects has been banned, liquids limited to small quantities only, passenger and baggage screening tightened, plus reinforced, outward-opening cockpit doors installed. Ironically, the presence of the crash axe in the cockpit, which Al Hammami used to attack Capt Machchhar, was also a result of the 9/11 crashes. Since all aircraft cockpits were thereafter heavily fortified, aviation regulators decided emergency breaching tools must be located there too rather than outside in the main cabin. It was meant to be within easy reach of only pilots in case of fires or crash emergencies, and not available to any passengers with nefarious plans! A glaring reason to rethink the entire safety procedure manual for airlines — and other mass transport services — is the mere presence of axes in cockpits. Indeed, the US even authorises 'properly trained' pilots to carry handguns on board flights. Imagine if a potentially radicalised pilot was able to wrest such an 'authorised' gun inside a locked cockpit. After the axe attack, nothing should be deemed impossible or unlikely anymore, and proper precautions taken. Yet Indian decisions to pre-emptively safeguard against future incidents, including changing cockpit safety protocols, will be tough to implement. There will be contrarian arguments galore, and possible engineered protests against 'targeting' segments, when precautions are mooted. And those forces who want to try again will actively foment these moves with appropriate incentives, as delayed implementation would be particularly beneficial for their plans. There is no national consensus in India on how to deal with and guard against jihadi terror. Influential voices in India and abroad doubt that such threats even exist and instead label it as the 'saffron' government's political agenda. In the first few hours after news filtered out of a heroic Indian pilot fighting off his co-pilot's murderous attack to save a planeload of Israelis en route to Tel Aviv, a certain type of Indian influencer decried the foiled attempt as a fake! But ordinary Indians — air, rail and bus passengers — should introspect about whether they will accept attempts to stymie security changes in light of this new kind of terror attack on any grounds. Safety and security in all modes of mass transport must be non-negotiable; they have to override all arguments. Otherwise, the potential consequences could be horrific. Think of what happened when Indira Gandhi refused to agree to major security changes after Op Blue Star. (The author is a freelance writer. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.)