The Migration Crisis in Spain: How Has Morocco Become the Scapegoat in the Electoral Battle?

Accusing Morocco of sending tens of thousands of people with the aim of bringing down the Spanish government—linking this alleged operation to a conspiracy involving Washington, Tel Aviv, and certain security services and judicial bodies—as well as resorting to offensive language against a sovereign state and an active member of the international community—can hardly be considered a rigorous parliamentary analysis of a complex phenomenon such as the migration crisis, for the management of which Spain bears a significant share of responsibility. Even more concerning is that, according to the information made public so far, these accusations have not been supported by conclusive police or intelligence evidence demonstrating the existence of an official Moroccan decision to organize the crossing of migrants or to use immigration as a political weapon. The Spanish Prime Minister stated before Parliament that there is no evidence proving that the Moroccan government organized the entry operation, although he acknowledged at the same time that there were security and intelligence failures that must be investigated and reviewed. This distinction is fundamental: proving that there were deficiencies in surveillance or failures in the security system does not automatically equate to proving that a foreign state made an official decision to use immigration for the purpose of destabilizing another government. The decree on Ceuta reveals the magnitude of the crisis, but does not substantiate the accusations against Morocco In this context, it is particularly important to revisit Royal Decree 681/2026, approved on August 25 and published in the Official State Gazette on August 26, 2026. The decree officially acknowledges the gravity of the situation arising from the persistent presence of a high number of immigrants in Ceuta, which has exceeded the city's usual capacity for reception, assistance, and security. On this basis, the decree declared Ceuta to be in a situation of special relevance to national security until December 31, 2026. However, it is significant that the content of the decree does not attribute responsibility for managing migration flows to the Moroccan state, nor does it constitute a legal ruling demonstrating the existence of an act of aggression or the so-called 'hybrid war.' The decree was adopted primarily to establish a legal framework that would allow for the mobilization and coordination of resources from the Spanish State and the autonomous city in order to address a multidimensional crisis. Therefore, turning this legal text into an indictment against Morocco clearly goes beyond what the decree itself establishes and transforms an administrative and security measure into a political conclusion that lacks direct evidence. Immigration Becomes a Card in the Electoral Battle Nor can this crisis be separated from Spain's domestic political context, especially at a time marked by electoral sensitivities. The Ceuta issue has rapidly shifted from being a matter related to border management and immigration to becoming a central element in the political struggle for power in Madrid. The right and the far right do not focus their rhetoric solely on how to address irregular immigration; they also seek to reinforce the image of a government incapable of protecting its borders, while portraying Morocco as a foreign power capable of influencing Spanish decisions. In this way, fear becomes an electoral issue, immigrants become a propaganda tool, and Morocco becomes the perfect adversary to blame for failures linked to Spanish migration policies. In this context, one cannot ignore the possibility that certain local political actors in Ceuta and Melilla benefit from keeping issues of sovereignty and identity at the center of the Spanish public debate, given these issues' ability to fuel social fears and exert pressure on the central government. But none of this allows us to conclude that Morocco planned the crisis or deliberately provoked the mass arrival of migrants. Such accusations require compelling evidence and reliable investigations, and a political conclusion should not become an established truth simply because it is repeated in electoral discourse. From Political Protest to Hate Speech The demonstrations held in front of the Moroccan Embassy in Madrid reveal another dimension of this transformation. The protests have shifted from questioning the government's handling of the migration crisis to becoming, in some cases, nationalist mobilizations that are openly hostile toward Morocco—especially given the participation of extremist organizations and the display of slogans that hold both Rabat and Madrid responsible for the crisis. The destruction or desecration of the Moroccan national flag during some of these rallies should not be considered a merely marginal incident either. The flag is a sovereign symbol of a state that maintains extensive strategic partnership relations with Spain, and any act of aggression against it can fuel feelings of hatred and increase the risk of attacks against members of the Moroccan community. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Spanish government to address these incidents with seriousness, just as it is incumbent upon the justice system to investigate them in accordance with the law—especially when freedom of expression and assembly crosses the line from political protest to incitement to racial hatred, calls for violence, or attacks against the national symbols of another state. A Strategic Partnership Despite Differences on Sovereignty The possible decision to summon the Moroccan ambassador—or the acting chargé d'affaires should the ambassador be outside Spanish territory—reflects the complexity of the relationship between Rabat and Madrid. Relations between Morocco and Spain are currently based on a broad partnership that encompasses security cooperation, trade and economic relations, the fight against terrorism, and immigration management, in addition to various regional issues. At the same time, the issue of Ceuta and Melilla remains one of the most sensitive matters in Moroccan political and social consciousness, while from the Spanish perspective, both cities constitute a highly sensitive sovereignty issue. Therefore, Spain's diplomatic protest against statements regarding these two cities can be interpreted as an attempt to define the boundaries of disagreement within the existing partnership—and not necessarily as a sign of a breakdown in relations or the prelude to a diplomatic crisis. As for calls to sever diplomatic and trade relations with Morocco, they seem to stem more from campaign slogans than from a truly viable political option. A decision of this kind would have consequences not only for Morocco but also for Spain and the European Union, and would directly affect the border and security cooperation that Europe itself needs. It is paradoxical that some of the voices calling for a suspension of cooperation with Morocco are the same ones criticizing the weakness of border control. How can one demand stronger border protection while at the same time undermining cooperation with the state that is one of the main partners in this area? Immigration is a shared responsibility, not a tool for political blackmail Previous migration crises have highlighted the existence of online incitement networks and human trafficking networks, as well as operational and coordination shortcomings related to crisis management in the Ceuta and Melilla area. However, the fight against these phenomena should not devolve into an exchange of accusations or an attempt to pin the blame for a crisis—in which political, economic, social, and security factors converge—on a single party. Managing irregular migration also requires an approach that goes beyond the logic of 'protecting European borders' from the outside, especially since Morocco has emphasized the need to address the root causes of migration, open legal and safe pathways for mobility, and strengthen international cooperation based on shared responsibility. The Moroccan Response: Evidence First, Diplomacy Second In the face of this rhetoric, a response based on emotional reactions or mutual insults does not appear to serve Morocco's interests. The most effective response should be grounded in firm diplomacy, accurate information, documented evidence, and the demand for a joint investigation or an independent European investigation that clearly determines individual and institutional responsibilities. Similarly, any offense against national symbols or any incitement against Moroccans should be addressed through legal and diplomatic channels, avoiding the generalization of hostility toward the Spanish people or the transformation of a political dispute into a conflict between two societies. The real problem lies not only in what happened at the border, but also in the battle being waged over the interpretation of those events. There are those who seek to portray the immigrant as evidence of a new 'invasion,' Morocco as the mastermind of the conspiracy, and the Spanish government as a symbol of treason and incompetence. In this kind of discourse, the facts disappear to make way for political agitation, while social concern becomes a tool for gaining electoral advantage. The Responsibility of the Elites in the Face of Disinformation Here, the responsibility of Moroccan intellectuals, elites, and media professionals takes on particular importance as we navigate this phase. Defending the state and national interests is not merely a matter of spouting slogans, but of relying on arguments, knowledge, and the ability to distinguish between legitimate political criticism and insults; between a matter that warrants investigation and baseless accusations; and between the defense of national interests and a drift toward racist nationalism of the opposite kind. The strength of a state is not measured by the harshness of its rhetoric, but by its ability to present a documented account of the facts, manage its crises prudently, and defend its interests through institutions and diplomatic and legal channels. Conclusion It is unlikely that the current crisis will lead to a rupture between Morocco and Spain. Rather, it could push both countries toward a more cautious and solid partnership, especially regarding border security, intelligence coordination, and immigration management. At the same time, the issue of Ceuta and Melilla will continue to feature prominently in Spanish political discourse, especially during election campaigns, now that the far right has found in it an issue capable of combining immigration, sovereignty, security, and criticism of the government. The challenge for Spain is to prevent the migration crisis from becoming a pretext to legitimize hate speech and racism. For Morocco, the challenge is to prevent its adversaries from exploiting information gaps to impose misleading narratives or unsubstantiated accusations. States do not protect their image through silence, nor through exaggeration or emotional reactions. They protect it through the strength of their institutions, the clarity of their public discourse, the accuracy of their evidence, and the prudence of their diplomatic stance. Ultimately, accusations that are not backed by reliable investigations or clear evidence—no matter how loudly they are voiced under the dome of Parliament—will remain closer to electoral propaganda than to political truth. Dr. Lahoucine Bekkar Sbaaï. Political analyst and strategy expert. Director of the Africa and International Cooperation Division at the International Center for Security, Migration, and Development. Translated from Arabic by: Abdessamad Benyaich