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Brics+ leaders arrive in New Delhi this week facing an uncomfortable paradox. The grouping increasingly claims to be the definitive voice of the Global South, yet its rapid expansion has diluted its core alignment. With two member states actively on opposing sides of the Middle East war, what can Brics actually offer its members beyond geopolitical posturing?
President Cyril Ramaphosa will join the leaders of the expanded bloc in India for the September 12 and 13 summit at a moment when the US and Iran have again exchanged strikes and the conflict is threatening energy markets and the security of vital shipping routes. South Africa has called for an end to the fighting and a negotiated settlement.
Ramaphosa is expected to hold bilateral meetings with other heads of Brics+ member states. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian are expected to attend the summit.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on September 1 2026. Picture:
(Kristina Solovyova)
The difficulty for Brics+ is structural because Iran is a member and so are Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both of which have been drawn into the US/Israel-Iran conflict and have faced Iranian attacks while maintaining close security relationships with the US. The result is a grouping whose members have fundamentally different interests in the most consequential geopolitical crisis confronting the world.
The meetings are expected to focus on trade, funding for development and changes to global institutions. But the private talks are likely to be dominated by the Middle East conflict and disagreements between Iran and the UAE. Iran is expected to seek wording in the summit's final statement that supports its position on the recent conflict, military strikes and sanctions. This could make an agreement difficult.
Brics+ decisions require all members to agree, so one country can block wording it opposes. That fracture was already visible at the Brics+ foreign ministers meeting in Delhi in May. The forum failed to produce a joint statement after disagreements over the conflict, settling instead for a chair's statement that acknowledged differences among members. The meetings next week are likely to produce a similar outcome.
This matters because Brics+ has spent the past three years selling expansion as evidence of its growing relevance. The Johannesburg summit in 2023 and Kazan in 2024 successfully broadened the grouping beyond its original five members. It now has 11 members and 10 partners, spanning Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Eurasia and Latin America.
Expansion increased the Brics+ bloc's economic and diplomatic weight. It also multiplied the number of interests that must be reconciled. Brics+ can issue statements about multipolarity, reform of global institutions and respect for sovereignty. It can call for diplomacy. But if it cannot even agree on language concerning a war involving three of its members, its claim to provide a meaningful alternative to the existing international order starts to look less convincing.
The summit should not be judged by whether it produces the most forceful condemnation of Washington or Israel though. That would reduce Brics+ to an anti-American talkshop and play directly into the criticism that the grouping is more effective at opposing the West than delivering practical benefits to its members.
The group should focus on protecting trade and shipping routes, co-ordinating responses to energy shocks, strengthening alternative payment mechanisms, facilitating investment and using institutions such as the New Development Bank to cushion members from external financial pressures.
These are areas where the bloc can offer tangible benefits without requiring every member to adopt the same foreign policy.
Business Day
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